Fordham International Law Journal
Volume 29, Issue 4

2005

Article 6

A Commentary on Selected Opinions of
Advocate General Jacobs
Rosa Greaves∗

∗

Copyright c 2005 by the authors. Fordham International Law Journal is produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press (bepress). http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ilj

A Commentary on Selected Opinions of
Advocate General Jacobs
Rosa Greaves

Abstract
This Article seeks simply to demonstrate, by reference to carefully selected opinions, Advocate General Jacobs’ commitment to the establishment of the internal market (as illustrated by
HAG II, Leclerc-Siplec, Alpine Investments, and Silhouette) and to the development of a Community legal order in which individual rights are fully protected at national and Community levels
(in, for example, Konstantinidis, Vaneetveld, Unilever, and UPA).
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OF ADVOCATE GENERAL JACOBS
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INTRODUCTION
Francis Jacobs retired in December 2005, having been a
member of the European Court ofJustice ("ECJ" or the "Court")
for seventeen years and the second-longest holder of the office
of Advocate General.' He took up his appointment as the European Project had just been restarted, following the adoption of
the Single European Act 2 and the establishment of the Court of
First Instance ("CFI").' The Single European Act provided the
Community with further legal bases for action and reformed its
* Allen & Overy Professor of European Law and Director of the Durham European Law Institute, Durham University, UK I am grateful to Albertina Albors-Llorens
(University of Cambridge, UK), as well as Roy Davis and Colin Warbrick (University of
Durham, UK), for advice on various aspects of this Article. I would like also to thank
Sebastian Harter-Bachmann, a research student at the University of Durham (UK), for
his assistance with sources and references.
1. Francis Jacobs was appointed Advocate General in October 1988 as the successor to Sir Gordon Slynn. Prior to Sir Slynn's tenure, Advocate General Karl Roemer
held the office from February 1953 to October 1973. According to Article 222 of the
Treaty Establishing the European Community ("EC Treaty"), the Court shall be assisted
by eight Advocates General. For the text of the current consolidated version of the EC
Treaty as amended, see Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European
Community, O.J. C 325/33 (2002) [hereinafter Consolidated EC Treaty]. Given that
there is a smaller number of posts than Member States, there is an informal agreement
between Member States that five Advocates General are appointed from the five largest
Member States (France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, and Spain), while the
other three rotate among the remaining Member States. Author's Note: All textual
references to articles of the EC Treaty refer to the Consolidated EC Treaty. In cases
decided prior to the Treaty of Amsterdam, references to articles of the EC Treaty are to
the text of the original and the numbers will differ from those mentioned in the text of
this Article.
2. Single Europe Act, OJ. L 169/1 (1987), [1987] 2 C.M.L.R. 741 [hereinafter
SEA] (amending the Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25,
1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter EEC Treaty]).
3. See Treaty Establishing the European Community, art. 222, Feb. 7, 1991, OJ.
224/1 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 573 [hereinafter EC Treaty]. The Treaty on European Union ("TEU"), Feb. 7, 1991, O.J. C 224/1 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 719,
amended the Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community ("EEC Treaty"),
Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, which had already been amended by the Single Europe
Act ("SEA"), supra note 2, OJ. L. 169/1 (1987). The EC Treaty was, in turn, amended
by the Treaty of Amsterdam, supra note 1, OJ. C 340/1 (1997). All of these amendments were incorporated into the EC Treaty, and the articles of the EC Treaty were
renumbered in the Consolidated EC Treaty, supra note 1, OJ. C 325/33 (2002).
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legislative process in order to achieve the objectives of the internal market4 by December 1992.' The establishment of the CFI
introduced an appeal structure to the European Community's
judicial architecture.
During those seventeen years, Jacobs delivered over 500
opinions. 6 Although the ECJ agreed with Jacobs' conclusions in
the vast majority of cases, there were some well-documented failures to persuade the Court to take a more radical approach.7
Advocate General Jacobs' background was ideally suited to
the role of Advocate General. He had been a Professor of Law at
King's College (University of London), an occasional practitioner, and a Legal Secretary to Jean-Pierre Warner, the first
British Advocate General. His opinions emulated academic papers, with serious consideration of the parties' submissions, a
meticulous analysis of existing ECJ case law and relevant literature, and a reasoned, authoritative and robust conclusion. His
opinions were awaited eagerly, widely read, and particularly scrutinized by the academic community.
This Article does not seek to evaluate or analyze Advocate
General Jacobs' opinions.8 It is not even possible to consider
herein all the most significant opinions delivered by Jacobs. He
served during an important and exciting period in the development of the Community legal order, as the European Economic
Area ("EEA") was established,9 certain important institutional
4. The expression "internal market" is the term used post-1988 for "common market." The expression "single European market" is also used, primarily by politicians.
5. See SEA, supra note 2, art. 13, O.J. L 169/1, at 9 (1987).
6. In the first few years of his mandate, the vast majority of his opinions were on
matters concerning agriculture, staff regulations, taxation and social security, but, given
the length of his tenure, it is not surprising that he delivered opinions on most areas of
Community competence.
7. In general, the ECJ does not often disagree with the opinion of the Advocates
General. One notable exception to this rule, however, was Union de Pequenos
Agricultores v. Council of the European Union, Case C-50/00P, [2002] E.C.R. 1-6677,
[2002] 3 C.M.L.R. 1 [hereinafter UPA], where the ECJ rejectedJacobs' plea to widen
the meaning of "individual concern" within Article 230 of the EC Treaty. This case is
discussed further below.
8. For an account of Advocate General Jacobs' opinions in relation to the development of Community law on intellectual property rights, see generally, NOREEN BuRRows
& ROSA GREAVEs, THE ADVOCATE GENERAL AND EC LAw (Oxford Univ. Press, forthcoming 2007).
9. The European Economic Area ("EEA") consists of all twenty-five Member States
of the European Union as well as Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Norway. It was created in
1992 to allow non-Community countries to benefit from the recently established inter-
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changes to the Community's legislative process were introduced
by amendments to the Treaty Establishing the European Community ("EC Treaty"), the European Union was created by the
Treaty of Maastricht,1" and the European Community was enlarged from twelve Member States to twenty-five. 1"
This Article seeks simply to demonstrate, by reference to
carefully selected opinions, 2 Advocate General Jacobs' commitment to the establishment of the internal market (as illustrated
by HAG II,' 3 Leclerc-Siplec,14 Alpine Investments, 5 and Silhouette6 )
and to the development of a Community legal order in which
individual rights are fully protected at national and Community
levels (in, for example, Konstantinidis,'7 Vaneetveld,18 Unilever, 9
nal market. References to the "Community market" or the "internal market" in the
context of this Article include the EEA market.
10. See TEU, supra note 3, OJ. C 224/1 (1992) (amending EEC Treaty, Mar. 25,
1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, as amended by SEA, supra note 2, OJ. L. 169/1 (1987). The TEU
was amended by the Treaty of Amsterdam, supra note 1, Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties establishing the European Communities and certain related acts, Oct. 2, 1997, O.J. C 340/1 (1997) [hereinafter Treaty of
Amsterdam]. These amendments were incorporated into the TEU, and the articles of
the TEU were renumbered in the Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European
Union, O.J. C 325/5 (2002) [hereinafter Consolidated TEU].
11. For a comprehensive review of institutional and substantive European Union
law see generally, for example, PAUL CRAIG & GRAINNE DE BORCA, EU LAw: TEXT, CASES
AND MATERIALS (3d ed. 2003); TREVOR HARTLEY, THE FOUNDATIONS OF EUROPEAN COMMUNrrY

LAw (5th ed. 2003); and

STEPHEN WEATHERILL,

CASES AND MATERIALS ON

EC

LAw (7th ed. 2005).
12. Almost all the selected opinions were delivered in preliminary rulings. This
procedure is provided by Article 234 of the EC Treaty, which enables a national court
dealing with a case that raises issues of interpretation and validity of Community law to
refer such questions to the ECJ for a preliminary ruling. The national court is bound to
apply the ruling on Community law when subsequently deciding the case. See Consolidated EC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 234, O.J. C 325/33, at 127-28 (2002).
13. Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, in SA CNL-SUCAL NV v. HAG GF AG,
Case C-10/89, [1990] E.C.R. 1-3711, [1990] 3 C.M.L.R. 571 [hereinafter Opinion of
Advocate General Jacobs, HAG II].
14. Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, in Socit6 d'Importation Edouard
Leclerc-Siplec v. TF1 Publicit6 SA and M6 Publicit6 SA, Case C-412/93, [1995] E.C.R. I179, [1995] 3 C.M.L.R. 422 [hereinafter Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, LeclercSiplec].
15. Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, in Alpine Investments BV v. Minister van
Finacifin, Case C-384/93, [1995] E.C.R. 1-1141, [1995] 2 C.M.L.R. 209 [hereinafter
Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, Alpine Investments].
16. Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, in Silhouette International Schmied
GmbH & Co KG v. Hartlauer Handelsgesellschaft mbH, Case C-355/96, [1998] E.C.R. I4799, [1998] 2 C.M.L.R. 953 [hereinafter Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, Silhouette].
17. Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, in Christos Konstantinidis v. Stadt Alten-
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and UPA2 1).
I. THE INTERNAL MARKET
In this Part, two Opinions on the compatibility of national
marketing rules with the internal market will be considered first.
Two Opinions concerning the exercise of intellectual property
rights will then be examined.
A. National MarketingRules and the Internal Market
One ofJacobs' most interesting Opinions concerned the interpretation of Article 28 of the EC Treaty, which prohibits
quantitative restrictions on imports and measures having an
equivalent effect between Member States. 2 1 In Leclerc-Siplec, Jacobs sought to persuade the ECJ to reconsider the test, adopted
by a Full Court in Keck and Mithouard,2 2 for determining whether
a national marketing rule is prohibited under Article 28.23
steig-Standesamt and Landratsamt Calw-Ordnungsamt, Case C-168/91, [1993] E.C.R. I1191, [1993] 3 C.M.L.R. 401 [hereinafter Opinion of Advocate GeneralJacobs, Konstantinidis].
18. Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, in Nicole Vaneetveld v. Le Foyer SA and
Le Foyer SA v. F~dfration des MutualitCs Socialistes et Syndicales de la Province de
Lioge, Case C-316/93, [1994] E.C.R. 1-763, [1994] 2 C.M.L.R. 852 [hereinafter Opinion
of Advocate General Jacobs, Vaneetveld].
19. Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, in Unilever Italia SpA v. Central Food
SpA, Case C-443/98, [2000] E.C.R. 1-7535, [2001] 1 C.M.L.R. 21 [hereinafter Opinion
of Advocate General Jacobs, Unilever].
20. Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, in Union de Pequenos Agricultores v.
Council of the European Union, Case C-50/OOP, [2002] E.C.R. 1-6677, [2002] 3
C.M.L.R. 1 [hereinafter Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, UPA]. This opinion was
delivered in the context of an appeal from a ruling of the CFI.
21. See Consolidated EC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 28, OJ. C 325/33, at 47 (2002).
22. Bernard Keck and Daniel Mithouard, Joined Cases C-267/91 & C-268/91,
[1993] E.C.R. 1-6097, [1995] 1 C.M.L.R. 101. Cases before the ECJ may be heard either
in plenary session (i.e. Full Court renamed Grand Chamber after the 2004 enlargement
of the EU) or in Chambers (by a lesser number ofjudges). See EEC Treaty, supranote 2,
art. 165, at 106; see also Michael Scott Feely & Peter M. Gilbuly, Green Law-Making: A
Primer on the European Community's Environmental Legislative Process, 24 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 653, 665 (1991).

23. See Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, Leclerc-Siplec, Case C-412/93, [1995]
28, [1995] 3 C.M.L.R. 422, 433. In Keck and Mithouard, decided
E.C.R. 1-179, 1-189,
one year earlier, the ECJ attempted to remove some of the confusion created by the
contradictions in previous case law regarding the scope of Article 28 by ruling that a law
prohibiting the resale of goods at a loss by retailers lay outside the scope of the treaty
provision. The Court, having expressly reversed earlier case law, provided a new test,
stating that certain national selling arrangements are outside the scope of the prohibition in Article 28, provided the rules apply equally, in law and in fact, to the marketing
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Jacobs considered whether a national restriction prohibiting the distribution sector from advertising on television 24 was
compatible with Article 28.25 He began by stressing the importance of advertising as a proven means of penetrating markets in
developed market economies. 26 He warned the ECJ to be "extremely vigilant when appraising the compatibility with Community law of restrictions on advertising." 27 He summarized the
prior, contradictory case law, and the ruling in Keck and
Mithouard.28 He then applied Keck and Mithouard to the facts of
Leclerc-Siplec, concluding without hesitation that the French law
prohibition fell outside the scope of Article 28.29 However, he
took the opportunity to criticize Keck and Mithouard and to propose a different test, even while admitting that, in Leclerc-Siplec
itself, the outcome would be identical.3 0
Jacobs found Keck and Mithouard unsatisfactory for several
reasons, including, in particular, its reintroduction of a discrimination test that he found unacceptable.3 ' Jacobs strongly argued
for the test to be based not on discrimination but on whether
the measure in question substantially restricts access to the Community market.3 2 This would inevitably introduce a de minimis
element to Article 28 where the national measure is classified as
a non-discriminatory restriction. Acknowledging that the Court
of both domestic products and products from other Member States. See Keck and
Mithouard, [1993] E.C.R. at 1-6104,
16, [1995] 1 C.M.L.R. at 124.
24. Specifically, Leclerc-Siplec was prevented by French law from advertising its
petrol stations on television. See Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, Leclerc-Siplec,
[1995] E.C.R. at 1-182,
2, [1995] 3 C.M.L.R. at 427.
25. See id. at 1-185,
12, [1995] 3 C.M.L.R. at 429.
26. See id. at 1-186-87, 9 19-22, [1995] 3 C.M.L.R. at 431-32.
27. Id. at 1-187,
21, [1995] 3 C.M.L.R. at 431.
28. See id. at 1-187-88, 99 23-24, [1995] 3 C.M.L.R. at 432. This ruling had already
been confirmed and applied in Hfinermund v. Landesapothekerkammer Baden-Wfirttemberg, Case C-292/92, [1993] E.C.R. 1-6787, a case concerning national restrictions
on advertisements. The restrictions at issue in Hunermund consisted of professional
rules of conduct that significantly restricted pharmacists from advertising the products
they sold in their pharmacies. The ECJ held the advertising restrictions were non-discriminatory selling arrangements, applicable to all pharmacists, which did not affect the
marketing of domestic and non-domestic products differently. See Opinion of Advocate
General Jacobs, Leclerc-Siplec, [1995] E.C.R. at 1-192-93, 1 35-36, [1995] 3 C.M.L.R. at
436-37.
29. See Opinion of Advocate GeneralJacobs, Lecerc-Siplec, [ 1995] E.C.R. at 1-193-94,
37, [1995] 3 C.M.L.R. at 437-38.
30. See id. at 1-194,
38, [1995] 3 C.M.L.R. at 438.
31. See id. at 1-194,
39, [1995] 3 C.M.L.R. at 438.
32. See id. at 1-195,
40, [1995] 3 C.M.L.R. at 439.
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had previously rejected a de minimis test for Article 28," Jacobs
nevertheless robustly argued that "[r]estrictions on trade should
not be tested against local conditions which happen to prevail in
each Member State, but against the aim of access to the entire
Community market. A discrimination test is therefore inconsistent as a matter of principle with the aims of the Treaty."3 4 Jacobs further noted that: "all undertakings which engage in a legitimate economic activity in a Member State should have unfettered access to the whole of the Community market, unless there
is a valid reason for denying them full access to a part of that
market."3 5
Jacobs undoubtedly holds very strong views on this matter,
as demonstrated by the mild, but highly unusual, expressed criticism of the Court. At paragraph forty-two of the Opinion, he
stated "[i]ndeed it is perhaps surprising that, in view of the
avowed aim of preventing excessive recourse to Article [28], the
Court did not opt for such a solution in Keck."36
Jacobs acknowledged that a de minimis test would necessitate careful definition of the circumstances when such a test
should be applied, as the national courts would have primary
responsibility for applying Article 28." The test should be applied only where the restriction is non-discriminatory, and denial to the market must be "substantial."3 Whenever a measure
prohibits the sale of goods lawfully marketed in another Member
State," a substantial impact on access to the market would be
assumed, since the goods are either being totally denied access
or permitted access only after modification.4 ° Where a measure
is applied without distinction and simply restricts certain selling
arrangements, its impact will depend on other factors. 41 Therefore, the scope of a barrier to market access may vary considera33. See id. at 1-197,
46, [1995] 3 C.M.L.R. at 441.
34. Id. at 1-195,
40, [1995] 3 C.M.L.R. at 439.
35. Id. at 1-195,
41, [1995] 3 C.M.L.R. at 439.
36. Id. at 1-195,
42, [1995] 3 C.M.L.R. at 439.
37. See id.
38. See id. at 1-196,
44, [1995] 3 C.M.L.R. at 4440.
39. As, for example, in Cassis de Dijon (Rewe Zentral AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung ffir Branntwein), Case 120/78, [1979] E.C.R. 649, [1979] 3 C.M.L.R.
494.
40. SeeOpinion of Advocate GeneralJacobs, Leclerc-Siplec, [1995] E.C.R. at 1-196,
44, [1995] 3 C.M.L.R. at 440.
41. See id. at 1-196,
45, [1995] 3 C.M.L.R. at 440.
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bly, and a particular barrier's compatibility with Article 28
42
should be assessed by reference to the de minimis test.
In applying the de minimis test to Leclerc-Siplec, Jacobs observed that whether a partial ban on advertising for a certain
sector of the economy falls outside the scope of Article 28 should
depend on whether it creates a substantial barrier to market access.4 3 After considering the relevant factors, Jacobs concluded
that there was no substantial impact on market access.44
Although Jacobs' approach is highly persuasive and centered on a fundamental principle of market access, the judges of
the Sixth Chamber of the ECJ rejected his de minimis test.45 Unsurprisingly-given that a Chamber rather than the Full Court
delivered the preliminary ruling-the judges followed the ruling
in Keck and Mithouardwithout reference to or comment on Advocate General Jacobs' alternative approach.4 6 Fortunately for the
parties, the result, as noted, would have been the same.4 v
It is submitted, however, that Jacobs' de minimis test has
much in its favor and is fully consistent with the ECJ's approach
to defining the scope of Article 81 of the EC Treaty,4 8 which pro-

hibits agreements that are anti-competitive and affect inter-State
trade.4 9 The main common objective of Articles 28 and 81 is to
integrate national markets into one single internal market that is
not divided along national territorial boundaries by national
laws and regulations or by private contractual arrangements.5"
42. See id.
43. See id. at 1-199,
52, [1995] 3 C.M.L.R. at 442.
44. See id. at 1-200,
55, [1995] 3 C.M.L.R. at 443-44.
45. See Soci& d'Importation Edouard Leclerc-Siplec v. TF1 Publicit6 SA and M6
Publicit6 SA, Case C-412/93, [1995] E.C.R. 1-179, 1-217,
21, [1995] 3 C.M.L.R. 422,
454 [hereinafter Leclerc-Siplec].
46. See id.
47. See id. at 1-218,
24, [1995] 3 C.M.L.R. at 454.
48. The ECJ has fully accepted a de minimis rule in the context of Article 81. See,
e.g., V61k v. Vervaecke, Case 5/69, [1969] E.C.R. 295, [1969] C.M.L.R. 273; see also Commission Notice, OJ. C 368/13,
1 (2001) [hereinafter Agreements of Minor Importance (de minimis)].
49. See Consolidated EC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 81, O.J. C 325/33, at 64-65
(2002).
50. The ECJ stated in Schul v. Inspecteur der Invoerrechten en Accijnzen that the concept of the common market involves the elimination of all obstacles to intra-Community trade "in order to merge the national markets into a single market bringing about
conditions as close as possible to those of a genuine internal market." Schul v. Inspecteur der Invoerrechten en Accijnzen, Case 15/81, [1982] E.C.R. 1409, at 1431-32,
33, [1982] 3 C.M.L.R. 229 at 251.
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While marketing rules remain governed primarily by national
laws, obstacles to the free movement of goods between national
markets are likely to persist. Only total harmonization of such
rules will eliminate all barriers. Meanwhile, however, the denial
of access to the market must be managed. The ECJ's earlier rulings on the scope of Article 28 were inconsistent, and the Keck
and Mithouard ruling remains problematic.5 1
Another fundamental principle of the internal market is the
right to provide services across national borders.5 2 This principle is outlined in Article 49 of the EC Treaty.5 3 Inevitably, as
questions concerning the interpretation and scope of Article 49
have arisen, analogies to the Article 28 case law have been
raised. 4 One important case was Alpine Investments.5 5 The ECJ
was asked to rule on whether the Dutch law prohibiting "cold
calling"5 6 was a restriction on the freedom to provide services
within the meaning of Article 49 EC Treaty. 7 Alpine Investments, established in the Netherlands, wished to market its financial services through "cold calls" to potential clients in Germany, where "cold calling" was permitted.5 8
Advocate General Jacobs delivered his Opinion in Alpine Investments before a Full Court, a few weeks before the ruling in
Leclerc-Siplec was delivered. 59 Both cases were similar insofar as
51. See Franz Leidenmuhler, The Free Movement of Goods Within an EC-Wide Market:
Still a Work in Progress, 12 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 163, 167-69 (2004).
52. This right has gained significance since the 1980s, as unprecedented advances
in technology and telecommunications have transformed the delivery of services.
53. See Consolidated EC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 49, O.J. C 325/33, at 54 (2002).
54. See, e.g., Staatssecretaris van Financien v. B.G.M. Verkooijen, Case 35/98,
[2000] E.C.R. 1-04071; Omega Spielhallen- und Automatenaufstellungs-GmbH v.
Oberburgermeisterin der Bundesstadt Bonn, Case 36/02, [2004] E.C.R. 09609; Canal
Satelite Digital SL Administracion General del Estado, Case 390/99, [2002] E.C.R. I607. But see Hans Reisch v. Burgermeister der Landeshauptstadt Salzburg, Cases 515/
99, 519/99 to 524/99 and 526/99 to 540/99, [2002] E.C.R. 1-02157.
55. Alpine Investments BV v. Minister van Finaciin, Case C-384/93, [1995] E.C.R.
1-1141, [1995] 2 C.M.L.R. 209 [hereinafter Alpine Investments].
56. "Cold calling" refers to the practice of making unsolicited telephone calls to
potential clients.
57. See Alpine Investments, [1995] E.C.R. at 1-1169,
1, [1995] 2 C.M.L.R. at 233.
58. See Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, Alpine Investments, Case C-384/93,
[1995] E.C.R. 1-1141, 1-1152,
36, [1995] 2 C.M.L.R. 209, 220. Alpine Investments
presented a novel situation to the ECJ. Normally, in situations involving cross-border
provision of services, the receiving (host) Member State imposes restrictions on the
delivery of the service. In Alpine Investments, however, the Netherlands (the home State)
had imposed the challenged restriction. See id. at 1-1144, 1, [1995] 2 C.M.L.R. at 213.
59. The Opinion for Alpine Investments was issued January 26, 1995; the ECJ ruling
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the Dutch prohibition was non-discriminatory and did not have
the object or effect of favoring domestic service providers over
those from other Member States.6 °

Jacobs' approach in Alpine Investments resembles that which
he adopted in Leclerc-Siplec. He stated that:
Whether a rule of the Member State of origin constitutes a
restriction on the freedom to provide services should be determined by reference to a functional criterion, that is to say,
whether it substantially impedes the ability of persons established in its territory to provide intra-Community services. It
seems to me that that criterion is consonant with the notion
of an internal market and more appropriate than the criterion of discrimination.6 1
The governments of the Netherlands and of the United
Kingdom had submitted that the ruling in Keck and Mithouard
should apply by analogy and that the disputed prohibition on
cold calling should be classified as a selling arrangement outside
the scope of Article 49.62 Not surprisingly, given his view of Keck
and Mithouard,Jacobs rejected this. He agreed that there were
similarities between the two freedoms, and similar principles
should apply to the interpretation of Articles 28 and 49 EC
Treaty, but Keck and Mithouardwas the wrong test to apply. 63 Jacobs expressly referred to the difficulties in determining the effect of the ruling in Keck and Mithouard,as set out in his opinion
in Leclerc-Siplec, and proceeded to highlight the differences between the two situations.6 4

It would be inappropriate to apply

Keck, he argued, since the exporting Member State in Alpine Investments sought to control the provision of services in the host
State. 65 If both the non-discriminatory restrictions of importing
and exporting Member States fell outside Article 49, the service
for Leclerc-Siplec was issued February 9, 1995. See generally Alpine Investments, [1995]
E.C.R. 1-1141, [1995] 2 C.M.L.R. 209; Leclerc-Siplec, Case C-412/93, [1995] E.C.R. 1-0179,
[1995] 3 C.M.L.R. 422.
60. See Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, Alpine Investments, [1995] E.C.R. at I1153, 38, [1995] 2 C.M.L.R. at 220; Opinion of Advocate GeneralJacobs, Leclerc-Siplec,
54, [1995] 3 C.M.L.R at 444.
[1995] E.C.R. at 1-0200,
61. Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, Alpine Investments, [1995] E.C.R. at I1155,
47, [1995] 2 C.M.L.R. at 222.
32, [1995] 2 C.M.L.R. at 219.
62. See id. at 1-1151,
60, [1995] 2 C.M.L.R. at 226.
63. See id. at 1-1159,
64. See id.
65. See id.
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provider would have to comply with both sets of rules.6 6
The ECJ paid much less attention in its ruling to the analogy with Keck and Mithouard and expressly refuted Jacobs' attempt to rely on the ruling. 67 Instead, the Court-arguably unnecessarily, having rejected the analogy argument-restated the
Keck and Mithouard test, adding by way of extra explanation that,
"[t]he reason is that the application of such provisions is not
such as to prevent access by the latter to the market of the Member State of importation or to impede such access more than it
impedes access by domestic products."6 8
The situation in Alpine Investments was totally different, as
the cold calling prohibition directly affected access to the market in services in other Member States. The use of the language
of "access to markets" rather than "selling arrangements" is
much closer to Jacobs' reasoning.
Thus, in Alpine Investments, Jacobs concluded that the Dutch
prohibition on "cold calling" was a non-discriminatory restriction within the meaning of Article 49.69 The Court agreed, since
the prohibition "deprive[d] the operators concerned of a rapid
and direct technique for marketing and for contacting potential
clients in other Member States."7 Jacobs then applied the conditions for determining whether the restriction was compatible
with Article 49.71 Both Jacobs and the ECJ concluded that the
restriction was justified in order to protect consumers and to
safeguard the reputation of the Dutch securities market.7 2

66. See id. at 1-1159,
61, [1995] 2 C.M.L.R. at 226.
67. See Alpine Investments, Case C-384/93, [1995] E.C.R. 1-1141, 1-1177, 136, [1995]
2 C.M.L.R. 209, 237.
68. Id. at 1-1177, 37, [1995] 2 C.M.L.R. at 237.
69. See Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, Alpine Investments, [ 1995] E.C.R. at I1159,
62, [1995] 2 C.M.L.R. at 226.
70. Alpine Investments, [1995] E.C.R. at 1-1176, 1 28, [1995] 2 C.M.L.R. at 236.
71. Specifically, Jacobs applied the three conditions that the Court had already
laid down in its case law, asking whether: (1) the rules were justified by imperative
reasons of public interest; (2) adequate protection of the public interest could be attained by less restrictive means; and (3) the interest in question was not protected adequately by the law of the Member State where the provider of services was established.
See Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, Alpine Investments, [1995] E.C.R. at 1-1160, 1
64, [1995] 2 C.M.L.R. at 226.
72. See id. at 1-1163,
78, [1995] 2 C.M.L.R. at 229; see also Alpine Investments,
[1995] E.C.R. at 1-1166, 1 44, [1995] 2 C.M.L.R. at 240.
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B. IntellectualProperty Rights and the InternalMarket

One major barrier to an integrated European internal market is the protection of intellectual property rights, such as patents and trademarks, which are exclusive national property
rights, granted by national laws and exercised over national territories.7 3 The ECJ has been asked frequently by national courts
to define the scope of Article 28 of the EC Treaty in the context
of goods protected by intellectual property rights.7 4 Article 30 of
the EC Treaty provides an expressed derogation from the prohibition of Article 28 in favor of intellectual property owners.7 5 Almost two years after his appointment as Advocate General, Jacobs delivered his first Opinion on the so-called "inherent" conflict between national rights of trademark owners and the EC
Treaty rules on the free movement of goods,76 in HAG

."

He

successfully advised the Court to reverse its earlier ruling in HAG
L78 As the ECJ rarely expressly overrules earlier decisions, this
case has historical significance irrespective of its subject matter.
The ECJ in HAG I had adopted the "common origin" doctrine: where similar or identical trademarks were originally
owned by the same natural or legal person, but later become the
property of two different owners in different Member States,
73. See Hugh Laddie, National LP. Rights: A Moribund Anachronism in a FederalEurope, 23 EuR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 402, 403-04 (2001).
74. See, e.g., Administration des douanes et droits indirects v. Rioglass SA and
Transremar SL, Case C-115/02, [2003] E.C.R. 12705, [2006] 1 C.M.L.R. 12 (asking the
ECJ whether Article 28 protection extends preclude customs detention of goods intended for sale in a non-member country while in transit through a member country);
Land Hessen v. G. Ricordi & Co. Buhnen- und Musikverlag GmbH, Case C-360/00,
[2002] E.C.R. 1-05089, [2004] 2 C.M.L.R. 20 (considering the applicability of non-discrimination to copyrights that arose prior to the EEC Treaty's entry into force); Regie
Nationale des Usines Renault SA v. Maxicar SpA, Case C-38/98, [2000] E.C.R. 1-2973
(asking whether Article 28 protected the intellectual property rights of an automobile
body parts manufacturer).
75. See Consolidated EC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 30, O.J. C 325/33, at 47 (2002)
(allowing derogation for "protection of industrial and commercial property").
76. Jacobs has delivered a large number of opinions in cases involving trademark
rights and Community law. In particular, after the adoption of the Trade Mark Directive, Council Directive No. 89/104, O.J. L 40/1 (1989), he played a significant role in
the development of the Community's trademark law by delivering opinions in almost
all of the cases that raised issues of interpretation regarding the Directive's various provisions.
77. SA CNL-SUCAL NV v. HAG CF AG, Case C-10/89, [1990] E.C.R. 1-3711,
[1990] 3 C.M.L.R. 571 [hereinafter HAG II].
78. Van Zuylen v. HAG, Case 192/73, [1974] E.C.R. 731, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. 127
[hereinafter HAG I].
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neither current owner could keep the other's trademarked
goods, which had been lawfully placed on the market in a Member State, out of their respective territories.7 9 Thus the EC
Treaty rules on free movement of goods prevailed over nationally owned trademark rights."0 Unfortunately, twenty years
elapsed before a similar case was referred to the ECJ that would
enable the Court to reconsider this heavily criticized 8 doctrine.
Advocate General Jacobs' Opinion in HAG H is remarkable
for the forthright manner in which he demolished the Court's
reasoning in HAG L82 He considered the principal fault of HAG
I to be the ECJ's failure to explain why the mere fact that trademarks have a common origin is relevant in the absence of any
market-sharing agreement.8 3 Jacobs directly attacked the doctrine of common origin, finding no rational basis for it, and challenged the Court to justify it by reference to the EC Treaty. In
fairness to the ECJ, Jacobs acknowledged, quoting from the
opinion of Advocate General Dutheillet de Lamothe in Sirena v.
Eda,8 4 that twenty years earlier there had been a negative attitude towards the value of the interests protected by trademarks,
by comparison to those protected by patents. 8 5 However, Jacobs
also criticized the Court's attempt to legitimize the doctrine of
common origin two years later in Terrapin v. Terranova.8 6 According to Jacobs, the Court misunderstood "origin" in the context of the essential function of a trademark, which is to guarantee to consumers that the product has the same commercial origin,
and not to guarantee the historical origin of the trademark it79. See id. at 744,
15, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. at 144.
80. See id. at 744,
13, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. at 144
81. For criticism of the common origin doctrine, see William R. Cornish, Trade
Marks, Customer Confusion and the Common Market, 38 MOD. L. REv. 329 (1975); see also
Francis A. Mann, Industrial Property and the E.E.C. Treaty, 24 ITr'L & CoMP. L.Q. 31

(1975).
82. See Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, HAG II, Case C-10/89, [1990] E.C.R.
1-3711, 1-3733-34, 1 22, [1990] 3 C.M.L.R. 571, 584-86.
83. See id. at 1-3734,
26(iv), [1990] 3 C.M.L.R. at 585-86.
84. See Opinion of Advocate General Lamothe, Sirena S.r.l. v. Eda S.r.l., Case 40/
70, [1971] E.C.R. 69, 87,
1, [1971] C.M.L.R. 260, 264-65. See also Sirena S.r.l. v. Eda
S.r.l., Case 40/70, [1971] E.C.R. 69, 82, 17, [1971] C.M.L.R. 260, 273 (citing Advocate
General Lamothe's comment).
85. See Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, HAG II, [1990] E.C.R. at 1-3731, 1 16,
[1990] 3 C.M.L.R. at 582.
86. See id. at 1-3735, 24, [1990] 3 C.M.L.R. at 582 (citing Terrapin (Overseas) Ltd. v.
Terranova Industrie C. A. Kapferer & Co., Case 119/75, [1976] E.C.R. 1039, [1976] 2
C.M.L.R. 482).
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self.s 7 By the time Terrapin v. Terranova was decided, the Court
had already recognized that trademarks have two functions: to
protect the owner's goodwill, and to protect consumers from
confusion or deception as to the origin of the goods.8" Jacobs
further implied that the Court should have reasoned more logically in Terrapin v. Terranova, instead of confirming the position
adopted in HAG L89 He concluded that the doctrine of common origin "is not a legitimate creature of Community law,"9"
and reminded the Court that post-HAG I case law on the exercise of intellectual property rights had developed and centered
around the notion of "consent."" t The doctrine of common origin was not reconcilable with the notion of consent where the
property had been expropriated by the State.9 2
The ECJ in HAG I!abandoned the doctrine of common origin, ruling that "it should be stated at the outset that the Court
believes it necessary to reconsider the interpretation given in...
[HAG 1] in the light of the case law which has developed with
regard to the relationship between industrial and commercial
property and the general rules of the Treaty, particularly in the
sphere of the free movement of goods."9 3 It is not clear whether
this reversal would have happened irrespective of Jacobs' opinion. One judge in the case, Ren6 Joliet, was familiar with intellectual property rights law and, as a former academic, was fully
aware of the criticism of HAG !and Terrapin v. Terranova.9 4 Nevertheless, Jacobs' Opinion is a coherent, authoritative, and robust demolition of the ECJ's reasoning in both rulings.9 5
87. See Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, HAG II, [1990] E.C.R. at 1-3735, 24,
[1990] 3 C.M.L.R. at 582.
88. Seegenerally Centrafarm v. Winthrop, Case 16/74, [1974] E.C.R. 1183, [1974] 2
C.M.L.R. 480.
89. See Opinion of Advocate GeneralJacobs, HAG II, [1990] E.C.R. at 1-3736-37, 7
26, [1990] 3 C.M.L.R. at 588.
90. Id.
91. See id. at 1-3737, 77 27-28, [1990] 3 C.M.L.R. at 588-89.
92. See id. at 1-3738, 7 31-32, [1990] 3 C.M.L.R. at 590.
93. HAG II, Case C-10/89, [1990] E.C.R. 1-3711, 1-3757,
10, [1990] 3 C.M.L.R.
571,607.
94. For an article illustrating Joliet's familiarity with intellectual property law, see
Ren6 Joliet, Trademark Law and the Free Movement of Goods: The Overrulingof theJudgment
in Hag I, 22 INT. REv. oF INDUS. PROP. & COPYMGHT L. 303 (1991).
95. Interestingly, Jacobs criticized the Court for lack ofjustifications for adopting
the doctrine of common origin in the HAG Iruling, and specifically mentioned the fact
that the Court's ruling was set out only in ten short paragraphs. See Opinion of Advocate GeneralJacobs, HAG II, [1990] E.C.R. at 1-3732, 21, [1990] 3 C.M.L.R. at 584. In
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9 6 raised the issue of exThe case of Silhouette v. Hartlauey
haustion of trademark rights again in 1998. 9 ' In Silhouette, the
national court sought clarification as to whether Community law
required Member States to adopt the principle of international
exhaustion.9 8 The doctrine of exhaustion of intellectual property rights, developed by the ECJ in case law to resolve the conflict between the prohibition of Article 28 and the derogation in
Article 30, has been primarily based on the existence or absence
of "consent" on the part of the relevant right-holder.9 9 If placed
on the Community market by (or with the consent of) the owners of intellectual property rights, products protected by such
rights are free to circulate anywhere within that market.
Community legislation now governs the matter. Article 7 (1)
of the Trade Marks Directive1 °° states that: "[t]he trademark
HAG II, even though the ECJ expressly overturned a twenty year-old doctrine, the Court
dealt with this whole matter in only ten paragraphs! See HAG II, [1990] E.C.R. 1-3711, 13757-60, 1 11-20, [1990] 3 C.M.L.R. 571, 607-09. This contrasts dramatically with Jacobs' opinion in HAG II, which comprised sixty-five paragraphs. See Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, HAG II, [1990] E.C.R. at 1-3727-51, 11 7-72, [1990] 3 C.M.L.R. at
578-605.
96. Silhouette International Schmied GmbH & Co KG v. Hartlauer Handelsgesellschaft mbH, Case C-355/96, [1998] E.C.R. 1-4822, [1998] 2 C.M.L.R. 953 [hereinafter
Silhouette].
97. See Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, Silhouette, Case C-355/96, [1998]
E.C.R. 1-4799, 1-4802, 1 3, [1998] 2 C.M.L.R. 953, 957.
98. See id. at 14809-10,
29, [1998] 2 C.M.L.R. at 962; see also Silhouette, [1998]
E.C.R. at 14828, 11 14-15, [1998] 2 C.M.L.R. at 975. The goods in question-trademarked outdated models of spectacle frames-had been placed on the market outside
the Community with instructions to the purchaser not to export the goods to any other
country. See Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, Silhouette, [1998] E.C.R. at 14806-07,
16, [1998] 2 C.M.L.R. at 960. The goods, however, were imported into the Community by a third-party, and Silhouette, the trademark owner, sought to prevent the importation of the trademarked goods claiming that they were not placed on the Community
market with its consent. See id. at 14807, I 17-18, [1998] 2 C.M.L.R. at 960.
99. In Deutsche Grammophon Gesellschaft mbH. v. Metro-SB-Grossmirkte GmbH & Co.
K.G., Advocate General Roemer proposed a criterion of dependency to reconcile the
Free Movement of Goods rules with the rights of intellectual property owners. See
Deutsche Grammophon Gesellschaft mbH. v. Metro-SB-Grossmarkte GmbH & Co.
KG., Case 78/70, [1971] E.C.R. 487, [1971] C.M.L.R. 631. He concluded that a trademark owner exhausted his rights where the goods were placed in the territory of another Member State by the trademark owner or an undertaking dependent on the
owner. See Opinion of Advocate General Roemer, Deutsche Grammophon Gesellschaft
mbH. v. Metro-SB-Grossmarkte GmbH & Co. K.G., Case 78/70, [1971] E.C.R. 487, 50608, [1971] C.M.L.R. 631, 647-49. The ECJ, however, replaced the criterion of dependency by one of consent. See Deutsche Grammophon, Case 78/70, [1971] E.C.R. at 500,
13, [1971] C.M.L.R. at 657-58.
100. See Council Directive No. 89/104, OJ. L 40/1, at 1 (1989).
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shall not entitle the proprietor to prohibit its use in relation to
goods which have been put on the market in the Community
10 1
under that trademark by the proprietor or with his consent."
It was clear from the legislative history of the Trade Mark
Directive that Article 7 (1) does not require the Member States to
adopt a principle of international exhaustion, but less clear
whether Article 7(1) prohibited the adoption of such a principle
by a Member State. 10 2 Jacobs conceded that the adoption of the
principle of international exhaustion would be favorable to consumers and promote competition. 0 3 His main concern, however, was to safeguard the integrity of the internal market.1 °4 In
his view, the ECJ's case law on trademarks was developed "in the
context of the Community, not the world market."'0 5 He decided to interpret Article 7(1) literally, concluding that Article
7 (1) provides for exhaustion only where goods are placed in the
Community (that is, the EEA) market.10 6 Thus, Member States
could not adopt any other doctrine. He stated that, "[i]f some
Member States practice international exhaustion while others do
not, there will be barriers to trade within the internal market
10 7
which it is precisely the object of the Directive to remove.
The ECJ expressed its conclusions as to the purpose of the
Directive and the Member States' inability to provide for international exhaustion in substantially identical wording.10 8
II. RIGHTS OF INDIVIDUALS UADER COMMUNITY LAW
Before being appointed an Advocate General, Francis Jacobs was a well-respected expert on the European Convention
on Human Rights ("ECHR") 0 9 and therefore it is not surprising
101. Id. art. 7(1), OJ. L 40/1, at 7 (1989).
102. See generally Commission of the European Communities, Amended Proposal
for a First Council Directive to Approximate the Laws of the Member States Relationships to Trademarks, COM (85) 793 (Dec. 1985).
103. See Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, Silhouette, Case C-355/96, [1998]
E.C.R. 1-4799, 48,
4814-15, [1998] 2 C.M.L.R. 953, 967.
104. See id. at 1-4815,
52, [1998] 2 C.M.L.R. at 967.
105. Id. at 1-4815,
49, [1998] 2 C.M.L.R. at 967.
106. See id. at 1-4810, 30, [1998] 2 C.M.L.R. at 962.
107. Id. at 1-4812,
41, [1998] 2 C.M.L.R. at 964-65.
108. See Silhouette, Case C-355/96, [1998] E.CR. 1-4822, 1-4831,
27, [1998] 2
C.M.L.R. 953, 977.
109. Prior to his appointment, Jacobs was Professor of Law and Director of the
Centre for European Law at King's College, University of London. He is also the co-
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that he sought to promote individual rights. Four Opinions
have been selected as typical of his efforts to persuade the ECJ to
protect and extend the rights of individuals.
A. Human Rights Protected by Community Law
Jacobs' opinion in Konstantinidis"1 is a rather special example of his deeply held commitment to the development of
human rights principles as an essential element of the Community's legal order.
The question asked of the ECJ's Sixth Chamber was essentially whether a Member State national, established as a self-employed person in another Member State in which a different alphabet is used, is entitled, by virtue of Articles 12111 and 43 of
the EC Treaty, 1 12 to oppose the transliteration of his names in a
13
manner that seriously misrepresented their pronunciation.
Apart from considering the transliteration offensive to his religious sentiments, Mr. Konstantinidis also considered that his
human rights would have been infringed if this distortion of his
14
name adversely affected his right of free movement.1
Jacobs approached the problem by first determining
whether there was discrimination on the ground of nationality,
and then asking whether, even in the absence of discrimination,
the treatment accorded to Mr. Konstantinidis restricted his right
of establishment under Article 43 and/or breached fundamental
rights protected by Community law. 15 Jacobs concluded that
there was indirect discrimination: Greek nationals living in Germany had to have their names spelled according to a system that
neither respected their wishes nor considered the possibility of
author ofJACOBS & WHITE: EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS (3d ed. 2002,

now edited and continued by Clare Ovey & Robin C.A. White).
110. Christos Konstantinidis v. Stadt Altensteig-Standesamt and Landratsamt CalwOrdnungsamt, Case C-168/91, [1993] E.C.R. 1-1191, [1993] 3 C.M.L.R. 401 [hereinafter Konstantinidis]. The dispute arose when the applicant's Greek name, Christos Konstantinidis, was transcribed into Roman characters according to German national rules
which resulted in the applicant's name being rendered as 'Hrstos K6nstantinidgs.'
111. Article 12 of the EC Treaty prohibits discrimination on the grounds of nationality. Consolidated EC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 12, O.J. C 325/33, at 43 (2002).
112. Article 43 of the EC Treaty provides for the right of establishment. Consolidated EC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 43, O.J. C 325/33, at 52 (2002).
113. See Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, Konstantinidis, Case C-168/91,
[1993] E.C.R. 1-1191, 1-1199, 1-1202,
5, 10, [1993] 3 C.M.L.R. 401, 405, 409.
114. See id. at 1-1199,
5, [1993] 3 C.M.L.R. at 405.
115. See id.
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an objectionable degree of distortion. 116 Thus, Greek nationals
were treated differently than nationals from other Member
States.1 17 It had been submitted that such indirect discrimination should only be prohibited if tangible disadvantage was
shown, such as loss of income or administrative difficulties. Jacobs firmly rejected this submission, arguing that:
Community law does not regard the migrant worker (or the
self-employed migrant) purely as an economic agent and a
factor of production entitled to the same salary and working
conditions as nationals of the host State it regards him as a
human being who is entitled to live in that State 'in freedom
and dignity' . . . and to be spared any difference in treatment
that would render his life less comfortable, physically
or psy1 18
chologically, than the lives of the native population.
This was a remarkable assertion, given the well-documented historical foundation of the common market, whose four fundamental freedoms-goods, persons, services, and capital-are the
recognized four factors of production in a market economy.1 19
Jacobs took a totally different approach, concluding that it was
irrelevant whether economic loss was suffered by the transliteration of the applicant's name.1 20 It was enough that documents
such as birth, marriage and death certificates-"the most significant and sacred events in a person's existence"l1 1-were written
in a manner that the person found offensive.1 22 Jacobs opined
that, "[e]ven as regards entries in official registers [the applicant] is entitled to the same treatment as German nationals, un1 23
less there is objective justification for treating him differently,"
which was not the case here.
Having found indirect discrimination in breach of Article
12 of the EC Treaty, 1 24 it was unnecessary forJacobs to consider
116. See id. at 1-1204,
20, [1993] 3 C.M.L.R at 411-12.
117. See id.
118. Id. at 1-1204-05,
24, [1993] 3 C.M.L.R at 412, 413.
119. See Simone Suelzer McCormick, ASEM: A PromisingAttempt to Overcome Protective Regionalism and Facilitatethe Globalization of Trade, 10 ANN. SURV. INT'L & COMP. L.
233, 238 (2004).
120. See Opinion of Advocate GeneralJacobs, Konstantinidis, [1993] E.C.R. 1-1191,
1-1205-06,
25, 27, [1993] 3 C.M.L.R. 401, 413.
121. Id. at 1-1205,
26, [1993] 3 C.M.L.R at 413.
122. See id. at 1-1205-06, 1 26, 27, [1993] 3 C.M.L.R. at 413-14.
123. Id.
124. See id. at 1-1207, 77 30, 31, [1993] 3 C.M.L.R at 415.
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the issue of fundamental rights. Nevertheless, he took the opportunity to explain his deeply-held belief that there is a fundamental human right to one's own name under Community
law. 125 Jacobs criticized the European Convention on Human
Rights ("ECHR") for not providing a right of individuals to a
name and a personal identity, and for not recognizing an individual's right to be treated with respect for his dignity and moral
integrity. 12 6 He proceeded to review several Member State constitutions that supported his conclusion that there exists "a principle according to which the State must respect not only the
physical well-being of the individual but also his dignity, moral
integrity and sense of personal identity.' 2 7 Paragraph forty is
worth quoting in full:
A person's right to his name is fundamental in every sense of
the word. After all, what are we without our name? It is our
name that distinguishes each of us from the rest of humanity.
It is our name that gives us a sense of identity, dignity and
self-esteem. To strip a person of his rightful name is the ultimate degradation, as is evidenced by the common practice of
repressive penal regimes which28consists in substituting a number for the prisoner's name.'
The crucial question in Konstantinidiswas whether a person
exercising his Community right of free movement was, as a matter of Community law, entitled to object to treatment that constituted a breach of his fundamental rights. 129 Jacobs reviewed the
case law, concluding that Community law had developed considerably in this respect in the 1980s. 3 He also concluded that
migrant Community nationals are entitled not only to enjoy the
same living and working conditions as nationals of their host
Member State, but also to assume that wherever they go to earn
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

31, 40, [1993] 3 C.M.L.R at 415, 417.
See id. at 1-1207, 1-1209,
36, [1993] 3 C.M.L.R at 416.
See id. at 1-1208,
See id. at 1-1209, 1 39, [1993] 3 C.M.L.R at 417.
Id. at 1-1209, 1 40, [1993] 3 C.M.L.R at 417.
42, [1993] 3 C.M.L.R at 418.
See id. at 1-1210,
See id. In certain situations, Community law requires national legislation to be

tested for compliance with fundamental rights. These situations arise when the national legislation implements Community law and when an EC Treaty provision dero-

gating from the principle of free movement is invoked to justify a restriction on free
Cin&h4que and others v. F~d~ration nationale des cinemas franmovement. See, e.g.,

4ais, Joined Cases C-60 and C-61/84, [1985] E.C.R. 2605, 2627, 26, [1986] 1 C.M.L.R.
365, 386; Demirel v. Stadt Schwdbisch Gmfind, Case C-12/86, [1987] E.C.R. 3719, 3754,
28, [1989] 1 C.M.L.R. 421, 439-40.
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their living within the European Community, they will be treated
in accordance with a common code of fundamental values, particularly those laid down by the ECHR."'3 They are entitled to
say "civis europeus sum" and to invoke that status in order to
oppose any violation of their fundamental rights.' 3 2 Jacobs dismissed all major objections to this conclusion on various
grounds. 133
Predictably, the Court totally ignored the human rights issue, focusing on the circumstances of when the transcription of
the name of a migrant Greek national would be incompatible
with Article 42, and finding that this would be so where the degree of inconvenience interferes with the migrant's freedom to
exercise the right of establishment. 13 4 On the particular facts of
this case, such interference would be established if the transliterthat potential clients
ation of the migrant's name created a risk
5
persons.'1
other
with
him
could confuse
B. HorizontalDirect Effect of Directives
13 6
and Unilever1 37
The Opinions delivered in Vaneetveld
demonstrate Jacobs' concern with the extent to which individuals may be affected by a Member State's failure to discharge its
Treaty obligations in respect of directives. In Vaneetveld, Jacobs
argued robustly and with conviction in favor of a coherent Community legal system under which individuals should be allowed,
in certain circumstances, to rely on rights intended to be conferred upon them by non-implemented or incorrectly implemented directives, not only against Member States or emanations of the State (vertical direct effect), but also in national litigation against a private party (horizontal direct effect).138 After

131. SeeOpinion of Advocate GeneralJacobs, Konstantinidis,[1993] E.C.R at 121146, [1993] 3 C.M.L.R at 420.
132. See id.
47-50, [1993] 3 C.M.L.R at 420-22.
133. See id. at 1-1212-13,
15, [1993] 3
134. See Konstantinidis, Case C-168/91, [1993] E.C.R. 1-1191, 1218,
C.M.L.R. 401, 424.
16, [1993] 3 C.M.L.R. at 424.
135. See id. at 1-1218,
136. Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, Vaneetveld, Case C,316/93, [1994]
E.C.R. 1-763, [1994] 2 C.M.L.R. 852.
137. Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, Unilever, Case C-443/98, [2000] E.C.R.
1-7535, [2001] 1 C.M.L.R. 21.
138. See Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, Vaneetveld, Case C-316/93, [1994]
26, 31, 34, [1994] 2 C.M.L.R. 852, 860, 863-64.
E.C.R. at 1-763, 1-773, 1-775-76,
12,

2006]

A COMMENTARY ON SELECTED OPINIONS

examining the arguments regularly raised against the horizontal
direct effect of directives, he argued that there was no longer any
rational justification for denying such effect.' 3 9 At paragraph
twenty-six of the Opinion, he stated:
More than [thirty] years ago in Van Gend en Loos [Case 26/62,
Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen, [1963] E.C.R. 1, [1963] C.M.L.R. 105] the Court
recognised the specific character of Community law as a system of law which could not be reduced to an arrangement
between States, as was often the case in traditional international law. After the developments in the Community legal
system which have taken place since then, it may be necessary
to recognize that in certain circumstances directives which
have not been properly implemented may confer rights on
individuals even as against private bodies. Perhaps a particular contrast could be drawn in this respect between the Community legal order and the international legal order. 40
Jacobs denied that directives are binding only as to the result to
be achieved. 1 4 ' This was indeed the original objective, but the
reality now is very different. The Community legal order is
neither static nor complete, but is a continuously evolving legal
system, and therefore the ECJ's interpretative rulings may require modification to reflect political and constitutional
changes. In practice, Member States' discretion on how to implement directives "is severely limited by the detailed, exhaustive
nature of much of the legislation now emanating from the
Council in the form of directives. Many of the provisions contained in directives are, in consequence, ideally suited to have
direct effect."' 42
Once again, Jacobs sought a reversal of existing case law"'
when the facts did not strictly require him to do so, as confirmed
by the subsequent very brief ruling of the Second Chamber of
the ECJ.' 4 4 However, at the time Jacobs delivered the Opinion
139. See id. at 1-770-77,
18-36, [1994] 2 C.M.L.R. at 859-65.
140. Id. at 1-773, 26, [1994] 2 C.M.L.R. at 860.
28, [1994] 2 C.M.L.R. at 862.
141. See id. at 1-773-74,
142. Id.
143. See Marshall v. Southampton and South-West Hampshire Area Health Authority, Case 152/84, [1986] E.C.R. 723, [1986] 1 C.M.L.R. 688 [hereinafter Marshall1].
144. See Nicole Vaneetveld v. Le Foyer SA and Le Foyer SA v. F6d6ration des Mutualit~s Socialistes et Syndicales de la Province de Lihge, Case C-316/93, [1994] E.C.R. I763, 1-780-85, [1994] 2 C.M.L.R. 852, 865-68 [hereinafter Vaneetveld]. On the facts of
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in Vaneetveld-the preliminary reference in Faccini Dori" 5-in
which the ECJ had been expressly invited to re-examine the issue
of horizontal direct effect of directives, was pending before a
Full Court. 1 4 6 Although clearly speculative, it is reasonable to
suggest thatJacobs sought in Vaneetveld to publicize his views on
this issue.
Jacobs' concern with legal certainty and the effect on individual rights of "new-style" directives, particularly in their contractual arrangements governed by national law, may also be
seen in his Unilever opinion."' 7 That case, before the national
court concerned a dispute involving the supply of olive oil by
Unilever to Central Food."' 8 Central Food refused payment because the oil was not labeled in conformity with Italian legislation. "4' 9 That legislation, however, had not received European
Commission approval, as required by the relevant directive.' 5
Previously, in CIA Security, 1 ' the ECJ had ruled that a national court must refuse to apply, in litigation between private
parties, a national technical regulation that had not been notified to the European Commission as required by the relevant
directive.' 5 2 Jacobs expressly approved this ruling insofar as it
provided that, in order to safeguard the effectiveness of the control mechanism established by the directive, a Member State
should not be able to enforce against individuals a technical regthe case, the accident, which led to the civil litigation before the national court, took
place before the time period for implementing the directive into national law had
elapsed. See Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, Vaneetveld, Case C-316/93, [1994]
E.C.R. at 1-763, 1-768-69, 7 13-15, [1994] 2 C.M.L.R. 852, 857-58. Directives can be
relied on by individuals before national courts only after the expiry of the period laid
down in the directive for implementation into national law. See Vaneetveld, [1994] E.C.R.
16, [1994] 2 C.M.L.R. at 867.
at 1-784,
145. Faccini Dori v. Recreb Srl., Case C-91/92, [1994] E.C.R. 1-3325, [1995] 1
C.M.L.R. 665. Faccini confirmed that directives can have direct effect only against the
State or an emanation of the State. See id.
19, [1995] 1 C.M.L.R. at 689.
146. See id. at 1-3355,
147. Unilever Italia SpA v. Central Food SpA, Case C-443/98, [2000] E.C.R. 1-7535,
[2001] 1 C.M.L.R. 566 [hereinafter Unilever].
148. See id. at 1-7576-77, 7 18-22, [2001] 1 C.M.L.R. at 596.
19, [2001] 1 C.M.L.R. at 596.
149. See id. at 1-7576,
20, [2001] 1 C.M.L.R. at 596.
150. See id. at 1-7576,
151. CIA Security International SA v. Signalson SA and Securitel SPRL, Case C194/94, [1996] E.C.R. 1-2201, [1996] 2 C.M.L.R. 781 [hereinafter CIA Security].
152. See id. at 1-2228,

75, [1996] 2 C.M.L.R. at 807.
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ulation adopted without prior notification.1 53 However, the CIA
Security ruling was sufficiently wide to be interpreted as granting,
in all national litigation,1 5 4 horizontal direct effect to that directive. In Unilever,Jacobs focused on persuading the Full Court
not to extend the CIA Security ruling, by distinguishing the cases
on their facts. 155 He stressed that the CIA Security ruling had
concerned litigation between competitors on the basis of national rules prohibiting unfair trading practices. 156 In Unilever,
the national litigation concerned civil litigation based on the
157
parties' contractual relationship.
Jacobs fully acknowledged the various solutions that the ECJ
had already devised to counter the problems arising from the
failure of Member States to implement a directive properly
within the specified period.1 5 In earlier rulings the relevant directives were intended to confer rights on individuals. 59 Jacobs
argued, however, that the directive in Unilever was of a different
nature since its objective was not to harmonize laws and grant
rights to individuals, but to protect the free movement of goods
via a preventive control mechanism. 161 Jacobs concluded that,
under the circumstances, "the use of concepts such as transposition into national law and failure to do so within the applicable
time-limit is thus clearly not helpful,"' 16 1 thereby dismissing existing case law as inappropriate and proposing to consider the
matter "on the basis of general principles of Community law
alone. ' 162 Thus, if the non-notified national technical regulation constituted an obstacle to the free movement of goods, individuals could rely on Article 28 without the need to refer to the
16 3
directive.
153. See Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, Unilever, Case C-443/98, [2000]
E.C.R. 1-7535, 7558,
92, [2001] 1 C.M.L.R. 21, 587.
154. Jacobs' reference to the Opinion of Advocate General Elmer in CIA Security
supported this interpretation. See id. at 1-7558,
96, [2001] 1 C.M.L.R. at 588.
155. See id. at 1-7553-54, 11 64-71, [2001] 1 C.M.L.R. at 582.
156. See id. at 1-7554,
71, [2001] 1 C.M.L.R. at 583.
157. See id.
158. Specifically, the doctrine of consistent interpretation of national law in the
light of directives; the vertical direct effect of directives; and the absence of horizontal
direct effect of directives. See id. at 1-7555, 1 78, [2001] 1 C.M.L.R. at 584.
159. See id. at 1-7557,
86, [2001] 1 C.M.L.R. at 586.
160. See id. at 1-7555-56, 1-7557, 1 79, 86, [2001] 1 C.M.L.R. at 584, 586.
161. Id. at 1-7555-56,
79, [2001] 1 C.M.L.R. at 584.
162. Id. at 1-7556,
81, [2001] 1 C.M.L.R. at 585.
163. See id. at 1-7557,
85-86, [2001] 1 C.M.L.R. at 585-86.
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Jacobs then highlighted the problems that would arise for
individuals should the CIA Security ruling be applied to all types
1 64
of civil proceedings, particularly legal certainty and injustice.
Regarding legal certainty, it would be very difficult for traders to
be aware of whether Member States have complied with the procedural requirements under the directive.1 6 5 It would also be
unjust if failure to notify would render a technical regulation unenforceable in private civil litigation-an individual would lose
not because of his own failure to comply with a Community law
obligation, but because of a Member State's failure.16 6
The ECJ rejected Jacobs' reasoning, expressly finding that
CIA Security applied to all types of litigation between private parties.16 7 The Court expressly stated that the case law providing
that directives cannot themselves impose obligations on individuals-and therefore cannot be relied on as such against other
individuals-did not apply where non-compliance with procedural requirements of a directive constituted a substantial procedural defect, rendering inapplicable a technical regulation adopted
1 68
in breach of its provisions.
C. Locus Standi of Non-Privileged Applicants before the ECJ
The fourth paragraph of Article 230 of the EC Treaty provides for limited direct access to the ECJ for non-privileged applicants, namely natural and legal persons, when seeking annulment of an act adopted by a Community institution. 169 Individua Community act of "direct
als may only challenge the legality 7of
1 0
and individual concern" to them.
UPA1 7 1 concerned an appeal against an Order of the CFI
that had dismissed the application of an association of Spanish
farmers seeking the annulment of a regulation as inadmissible.17 2 The CFI dismissed the case on the ground that the associ99-101, [2001] 1 C.M.L.R. at 588-89.
164. See id. at 1-7559-60,
100, [2001] 1 C.M.L.R. at 588.
165. See id. at 1-7560,
101, [2001] 1 C.M.L.R. at 588-89.
166. See id. at 1-7560,
49, [2001] 1
167. See Unilever, Case C-443/98, [2000] E.C.R. 1-7535, 1-7584,
C.M.L.R. 21, 600-01.
168. See id. at 1-7584-85, 1 50, [2001] 1 C.M.L.R. at 601.
169. See Consolidated EC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 230, at 126.
170. See id.
171. UPA, Case C-50/00P, [2002] E.C.R. 1-6677, [2002] 3 C.M.L.R. 1.
172. See Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, UPA, Case C-50/OOP, [2002] E.C.R.
1-6677, 1-6681, 1 1, [2002] 3 C.M.L.R. 1, 6.
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ation's members were not individually concerned by the relevant
regulation, within the meaning of Article 230's fourth paragraph.1 7 3 Jacobs' Opinion was a passionate plea to the Full
Court to reverse previously strict interpretative rulings concerning the meaning of "individual concern." '7 4 Although Jacobs
failed to persuade the Court,17 1 the Opinion is a coherent, exhaustive, and thoughtful attempt to plug what many critics regard as a serious gap in the system of judicial remedies established by the EC Treaty.
The problem may be summarized as follows: The right to
effective judicial protection is a recognized principle of Community law, inherent in the system of remedies established by the
EC Treaty. The availability of an indirect challenge to Community acts via a preliminary reference is considered insufficient to
protect this right. Jacobs examined in detail the inappropriateness of the reference procedure in the context of challenges to
the validity of Community measures,' 7 6 concluding that existing
case law was incompatible with the principle of effective judicial
protection. 177 That conclusion raised the question of the circumstances under which locus standi should be granted, enabling
individuals to challenge general Community measures.1 78 Jacobs
proposed a novel but realistic interpretation of the notion of "individual concern. " 1 7 9 In his view "a person is to be regarded as
individually concerned by a Community measure where, by reason of his particular circumstances, the measure has, or is liable
to have, a substantial adverse effect on his interests."180
Jacobs urged the Court not to be influenced by the historical background of Article 230:
[The European Community] is now firmly established and its
legislative process, to a large extent based on the adoption of
measures by majority voting in the Council of Ministers and
the European Parliament, is sufficiently robust to withstand
173. See id. at 1-6683-86, 1 9-18, [2002] 3 C.M.L.R. at 10-12.
174. See id. at 1-6681-82, 77 1-4, [2002] 3 C.M.L.R. at 7-8.
175. See UPA, Case C-50/00P, [2002] E.C.R. 1-6677, 1-6736, 46, [2002] 3 C.M.L.R.
1, 48.
176. See Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, UPA, [2002] E.C.R. at 1-6694-95, It
45-48, [2002] 3 C.M.L.R. at 20-21.
49, [2002] 3 C.M.L.R. at 21.
177. See id. at 1-6695-96,
3, [2002] 3 C.M.L.R. at 8.
178. See id. at 1-6682,
60, [2002] 3 C.M.L.R. at 23.
179. See id. at 1-6698,
180. Id.
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judicial scrutiny at the instigation of individuals ....Community law now affects the interests of individuals directly, frequently and deeply; there is therefore a correspondingly
greater need for effective judicial protection against unlawful
action.' 81
Another reason Jacobs advanced for reconsidering the case
law on individual concern was "the Court's evolving case law on
the principle of effective protection of rights derived from Community law in national courts.' a 2 That case law imposes a high
standard on national legal systems, which contrasts negatively
with the limited access for individuals to the Community
courts.18 3 He also criticized the complexity and apparent inconsistency resulting from the Court's attempts to allow access
whenever the traditional approach would have led to a manifest
"denial of justice," concluding that it was "indisputable that access to the Court is one area above all where it is essential that
1 4
the law be clear, coherent and readily understandable.""
The ECJ, however, reaffirmed prior case law, stating that the
interpretation of "individual concern" cannot have the effect of
"setting aside the condition in question, expressly laid down in
the Treaty, without going beyond the jurisdiction conferred by
the Treaty on the Community Courts." 8 5
Interestingly, the Court-unnecessarily for the purpose of
this appeal-expressly stated that it was possible to envisage a
system of judicial review of Community measures differing from
that established by the founding Treaty."8 6 However, the Court
held that the Member States would need to reform the current
18 7
system.
CONCLUSION
What do the above Opinions tell us about Francis Jacobs,
who held the position of Advocate General for so long? It is submitted that they are the views of ajurist committed to an overrid181.
182.
183.
184.
185.

Id. at 1-6703-04,
77, [2002] 3 C.M.L.R. at 27-28.
Id. at 1-6711,
97, [2002] 3 C.M.L.R. at 34-35.
See id. at 1-6711,
98, [2002] 3 C.M.L.R. at 34-35.
Id. at 1-6712, 9 100, [2002] 3 C.M.L.R. at 36.
UPA, Case C-50/OOP, [2002] E.C.R. 1-6677, 1-6735,

48.
186. See id. at 1-6735-36,
187. See id.

1

45, [2002] 3 C.M.L.R. at 48.

44, [2002] 3 C.M.L.R. 1,
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ing objective of enhancing and protecting the rights of individuals within the Community legal order, in order to achieve various goals, including the establishment of an internal market.
Certainly, there is no evidence that Jacobs felt restrained
from pursuing those causes and publicizing his views, even when
a particular issue was not pivotal to the final ruling (for example,
Leclerc-Siplec, Konstantinidis and Vaneetveld). With regard to the
substantive law of the internal market, Jacobs' Opinions in
Leclerc-Siplec and Alpine Investments demonstrate his commitment
to freedom of access to an integrated European market in goods
and services, obstacles to those freedoms being tolerable only if
non-discriminatory and insignificant (de minimis), or justified
(Alpine Investments). Jacobs accepted that non-discriminatory national rules might nevertheless impede cross-border access to
goods and services lawfully marketed elsewhere in the European
Community. This was unavoidable in a Community consisting of
twenty-five national markets, largely governed by national rules.
His priority was apparently to ensure that such obstacles did not
substantially impede the main objective of the EC Treaty (as
amended), namely the establishment and maintenance of an integrated internal market.
However, where individual rights were involved, even market access became a secondary consideration. In HAG II and Silhouette, individual property rights prevailed over the free movement of goods and the benefit of consumers. This is not surprising, perhaps, given Jacobs' commitment to individual rights. He
argued emotionally and passionately in favor of Community law
protecting human rights (Konstantinidis) and consistently promoted the interests of individuals (Vaneetveld, Unilever and UPA).
The fact that the ECJ, in the specific cases, failed sometimes to
respond to such arguments (Leclerc-Siplec, Konstantinidis, Vaneetveld) or rejected them (Unilever and UPA) is perhaps unimportant, given that, at the very least, Jacobs' Opinions have contributed to lively and stimulating debates by academics and practitioners throughout the Community and beyond, on
controversial aspects of the Community's legal order.

